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How many colours? 1 
Abstract 
Isaac Newton’s first optical paper (published in the Philosophical Transactions in February 1672) 
was controversial: Newton argued for a new theory of light and colour when no one else 
thought the old one was inadequate, and moreover he claimed certain truth for his new 
theory!  A debate followed, in which Newton defended his claims against the objections of 
optical heavy weights such as Robert Hooke and Christiaan Huygens.  One major sticking 
point between Newton and his critics concerned the number and division of colours.  
Newton argued that there is an indefinite number of ‘primary’ colours, but Hooke and 
Huygens objected to this inflated ontology.  Each critic argued, for different reasons, that 
there were only two original colours.  I examine Newton’s responses to these objections.  I 
argue that they are revelatory of Newton’s unique methodology: a mathematico-experimental 
approach that eschewed ‘hypotheses’ in favour of ‘theories’.  I also show that we should read 
Newton’s claim that there are an ‘indefinite’ number of colours in epistemic terms.  
Nowadays, Newton’s first optical paper represents a landmark in the science of optics.  Its 
exploitation of the correspondence between refraction and spectral colour, provided a new 
approach to the study of light.  And its views on the properties and nature of light, set a new 
agenda for the field. 
 
1 Introduction 
In 1665, Cambridge University closed temporarily because of the plague and Isaac Newton 
went home to his family home of Woolsthorpe in Lincolnshire.  He was there for almost 
two years.  He was very active during this period: inventing calculus; conceiving the inverse-
square law of universal gravitation; and discovering the chromatic composition of white 
light.  These were Newton’s anni mirabiles (years of miracles).  One of Newton’s legacies, 
which can be traced to this period, is the ROYGBIV colour spectrum—familiar from our 
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schooldays.  But this legacy conceals the controversial nature of Newton’s theory of colour.  
One aspect of this controversy concerned the number and division of colours.  Newton 
argued that there is an indefinite number of primary colours, but privileged seven of them.  
Optical heavyweights Robert Hooke and Christiaan Huygens objected to this inflated 
ontology, each arguing for different reasons that there were only two primary colours.2 
In this paper, my aim is two-fold.  Firstly, I aim to make sense of Newton’s claims about 
the number of colours: in what sense are they indefinite, and in what sense is ROYGBIV 
privileged?  I shall argue that Newton’s claim that the number of colours is indefinite should 
be interpreted as an epistemological claim, rather than a metaphysical one.  That is, Newton 
thought the number of colours was unknown, as opposed to literally indefinite.  I shall then 
consider Newton’s seven main colours.  Newton started with five main colours—red, 
yellow, green, blue and violet—and then added orange and indigo later, in order to increase 
the analogy between colour and musical harmonics.  I shall argue that, contrary to the 
Pythagorean interpretation of this work, Newton was making a point about perception, not 
about ontology.  In other words, Newton’s privileging of the seven main colours was a 
matter of aesthetics, not metaphysics.  My second aim is to make sense of Hooke’s and 
Huygens’ criticisms of Newton’s theory of colour and see what his responses tell us about 
his methodology.  Their criticisms reveal them to be engaged in a different project to 
Newton’s.  Where Hooke presupposed a certain uniformity in light, and aimed to explain the 
appearance of different colours, Newton preferred to rely on his senses to tell him how many 
colours there are.  Where Huygens appealed to explanatory virtues and saw a crucial role for 
speculative hypotheses, Newton strove to avoid speculation, focusing on what could be 
mathematically stated about the phenomena.  In short, Newton had a unique methodology: a 
mathematico-experimental approach that prioritised observation and eschewed hypotheses. 
I shall begin by outlining Newton’s first optical paper, his ‘New Theory’, before moving 
onto the specifics of Newton’s account of primary colours. 
                                                 
2 Hooke and Huygens were wave theorists, and each would write a book concerning optics: Hooke wrote 
Micrographia (1665) and Huygens wrote Traité de la lumière (1690). 
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2 Newton’s ‘New Theory’ 
Newton publicised his new theory of light and colour in a paper dated 6 February 1672.3  It 
was read at a meeting of the Royal Society on 8 February 1672.  Newton wasn’t present, but 
news of its reception quickly reached him.  The reception was positive: the Fellows were 
most impressed with his account of light and colours, and the experiments he described.4  
Notwithstanding these initial reports, the paper had caused some raised eyebrows.  And not 
just because the main claim, that white light is heterogeneous, contradicted the established 
view of white light as ‘pure’ and homogeneous.  Newton was arguing for a new theory when 
no one else thought the old one was inadequate.  Moreover, he was claiming that his new 
theory was certainly true!  As Zev Bechler put it: 
This was bad form.  One doesn’t just walk in, announce a fundamental inconsistency in accepted 
scientific beliefs, declare the need for a revolution, perform it, and walk out.  Things are simply not 
done this way (Bechler, 1974: 117). 
It’s striking how much Newton does in such a short paper.  He reveals a new 
phenomenon that, in turn, reveals a new property of light.  He then uses this new insight to 
develop a new theory of colour—using it to explain the phenomena of coloured bodies.  As 
we shall see, in revealing and explaining this new phenomenon, Newton addressed a range 
                                                 
3 Commentators have found the style of Newton’s ‘New Theory’ enigmatic.  Not only because it attempts 
to put forward some very sophisticated and novel scientific ideas in such a short paper (it’s only about 5,000 
words long!), but also because it combines an experimental focus with a quasi-geometrical approach to 
theorising.  In fact, this paper is just the tip of the iceberg (Schaffer, 1986: 84).  Newton had been developing 
the ideas since 1665, and had presented them his Optical Lectures, delivered between 1670 and 1672 (Newton, 
1984). 
4 Henry Oldenburg, the founding Secretary of the Royal Society and the founding Editor of the 
Philosophical Transactions, wrote to Newton immediately to report on its reception: 
I can assure you, Sir, that it there mett both with a singular attention and an uncommon applause, insomuch that after they had 
order’d me to returne you very solemne and ample thankes in their name (which herewith I doe most cheerfully) they voted 
unanimously, that if you contradicted it not, this discourse should without delay be printed, there being cause to apprehend that the 
ingenuous & surprising notion therein contain’d (for such they were taken to be) may easily be snatched from you […] (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 107) 
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of assumptions made by the received theory of light, eventually demonstrating that one of its 
central assumptions, that white light is homogeneous, is false. 
2.1 A New Phenomenon 
Newton described his discovery in an anecdotal style,5 describing some experiments he 
performed in 1666, where he used glass prisms to examine “the celebrated Phænomena of 
Colours” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 92) (see figure 1 below for the initial experimental set-
up).  He wrote that what began as “a very pleasing divertisement, to view the vivid and 
intense colours produced thereby”, soon yielded some unexpected results (Newton, 1959-
1977: Vol. 1, 92).  The coloured image produced by the passage of white light through the 
glass prism was oblong,6 and yet, according to the received theory of light, the image should 
have appeared circular (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 92) (see figure 2 below).  So Newton set 
out to explain this discrepancy between the predicted result of this experiment and the actual 
result. 
                                                 
5 In fact, this is almost certainly a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the events that took place during the plague 
years (1665–1666).  As we shall see, the careful construction of the experimental set-up belies the feigned 
casualness with which Newton describes the experiment.  For discussion on this point, see (e.g. Whiteside, 
1966). 
6 More specifically, an elongated circle—curved at the ends and straight along the sides.  In later work, 
Newton often depicted this shape in an idealised form, as a sequence of overlapping circles (e.g. Newton, 1952: 
65, fig. 23).  Newton reported that the length of the image was 5 times longer than its breadth (Newton, 1959-
1977: Vol. 1, 92). 
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Figure 1 The set-up of Newton’s first prism experiment7 Figure 2 Comparison of results8 
It’s worth pausing, for a moment, to understand why this result was unexpected.  
According to the received theory of light, white light is homogeneous, travels in straight lines 
and obeys the sine law.9  From this theory, it followed that white light at equal angles of 
incidence should display equal angles of refraction when passing through the same medium.  
In other words, the white light from the sun should have retained its circular shape (i.e. the 
shape of the Sun’s disc) when projected onto the screen.  It might seem surprising that no 
one had noticed this discrepancy before.  Indeed, what Newton was doing was by no means 
new: scientists had been studying light using prisms, lenses and globes for centuries.10  How 
did Newton see something that no one else had seen?  It seems that two features of 
Newton’s experiment led him to his discovery.  Firstly, in most prism experiments, some 
amount of elongation was expected.  Indeed, as Sabra has pointed out: 
                                                 
7 The sunlight, S, enters through the aperture, a, passes through the prism and is projected onto the 
screen, bc. 
8 Where A is the expected result and B is the actual result. 
9 The sine law, also called ‘Snell’s Law’ or the ‘Snell-Descartes law’, states that the ratio of the sines of the 
angles of incidence and refraction is a constant that depends on the medium through which the light passes. 
10 For an account of some of this history, see (Lindberg, 1981). 
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[…] except for one definite position of the prism, namely that of minimum deviation, a certain 
elongation of the image should have been expected.  As we go on reading Newton’s paper, however, we 
soon discover that the prism was fixed at precisely that position (Sabra, 1967: 235).11 
And so, Newton’s prism was in a very specific position—the only position at which no 
elongation was expected. 
Secondly, most prism experiments had been carried out at short range, projecting images 
onto screens very close to the prism—at this distance, any elongation of the image would go 
unnoticed.  In contrast, Newton was projecting the refracted image onto a screen at a 
distance of 22 feet.  At this distance, the elongation effect would have been amplified.  In 
other words, despite what he suggested, Newton, didn’t begin by simply carrying out the 
standard optical experiments.  He ran a novel and carefully constructed experiment to test a 
specific prediction, aiming to generate a maximally clear result. 
Having observed the elongation of the image, Newton needed to explain it.  He began 
with the assumption that the received theory of light was correct, and set about trying to 
identify the source of the discrepancy between prediction and observation.  In doing so, he 
ensured the result truly clashed with the received theory, as opposed to an accidental false 
negative.  He started with a series of experiments that established that the elongation 
resulted from neither variation in the thickness of the glass, an imperfection in the prism, 
nor the curving of rays12 of light (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 93-94).  Then, maintaining his 
assumption of the sine law, he addressed the assumption that all the rays of light passing 
through the aperture have (roughly) the same angle of incidence—wondering if the amount 
of variation was significant after all.  To test this suspicion, Newton calculated the maximum 
variation of incidence-angles that could be expected of light travelling from the sun at a 
given time, and computed the greatest possible elongation based on this variation.  He 
                                                 
11 Moreover, Sabra notes, Newton’s assertion (that the image should have appeared circular) is the only 
indication of the experimental set-up in this paper.  This lack of clarity may well have been the source of the 
criticisms of Pardies (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 131) and Linus (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 317-319), both 
of whom objected that the elongated image could be explained by the received theory of light. 
12 In this context, a ‘ray’ is just some smallest part of light. 
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concluded that even the greatest possible variation would be too small to account for such a 
marked elongation.  In other words, Newton identified a partial cause of the discrepancy, but 
not one which explained the full effect.13  There remained a discrepancy to explain. 
Having checked all his other assumptions, Newton then considered his assumption that 
all the rays of light travelling through the aperture were homogeneous with respect to their 
refrangibility14—that is, they were unified in terms of their disposition to refract.  To test this 
assumption, Newton performed his ‘experimentum crucis’. 
 
Figure 3 The experimentum crucis15 
The experimental set up is as follows (see figure 3 above).  Firstly, a circular beam of 
light is projected through a prism and becomes elongated, just like in the first experiment.  
Then, instead of projecting the elongated image onto a screen, it is projected onto a series of 
boards with apertures in them, isolating a very narrow ray of light.  Finally, this narrow ray of 
                                                 
13 Pardies would claim that this variation was enough to account for the effect (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 
131). 
14 Refrangibility is the degree to which light can refract when passing from one medium into another, or a 
“predisposition, which every particular Ray hath to suffer a particular degree of Refraction” (Newton, 1959-
1977: Vol. 1, 96). 
15 In this experiment, light is projected from S, through aperture a, where it is projected through prism A 
onto the board bc, where most of the light is stopped.  A small amount is allowed through the aperture d, 
where it is stopped at the board ef.  A small amount of light is allowed through the aperture g, where it is 
projected through prism B, and finally hits the screen hi, forming the image, jk. 
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light is projected through a second prism and onto a screen.  The object of the experiment is 
to measure the angles of refraction by noting the placement of the projected image on the 
screen.  By rotating the first prism, Newton was able to isolate different parts of the 
elongated image, and then note the placements of the light on the final screen.  He noticed 
that the highest images on the screen (hi) were from the top part of the image (bc), and the 
lowest images on the screen (hi) were from the bottom part of the image (bc).  Newton 
reported: 
And I saw by the variation of those places, that the light, tending to that end of the Image, towards 
which the refraction of the first Prisme was made, did in the second Prisme suffer a Refraction 
considerably greater then the light tending to the other end (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 94-95).16 
What Newton had noticed was that, for any given ray, refrangibility was a constant, but 
this disposition to refract varied between rays.  That is, if a particular ray bent to an angle of 
x degrees after passing through the first prism, then it bent to an angle of x degrees after 
passing through the second prism as well.  The outcome of this experiment led Newton to 
reject the assumption of homogeneity and conclude that white light is a heterogeneous mixture of 
rays: 
And so the true cause of the length of that image was detected to be no other, then that Light consists 
of Rays differently refrangible, which, without any respect to a difference in their incidence, were, according 
to their degrees of refrangibility, transmitted towards divers parts of the wall (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 
1, 95). 
In sum, in a few short pages, Newton had discovered a new phenomenon (the elongation of 
light), had revealed a new property of light (variation in refrangibility), and had thus refuted 
the received theory of light. 
The implications of Newton’s discovery were significant.  For one thing, it had 
consequences for the development of telescopes, which he described in a fairly brief 
                                                 
16 Commentators (e.g. Jalobeanu, 2014, Stein, 2004) have noted that Newton’s description of this result is 
surprisingly awkward.  This is probably due to the difficulty of describing the experiment without speaking 
about colours.  We’ll discuss the importance of this move below. 
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digression.  Most of his contemporaries had attributed the imperfection of telescopic images 
to the imperfection of the lenses.  However, Newton’s discovery indicated a significant 
limitation that had nothing to do with glass-grinding techniques.  That is, even if a lens could 
perfectly collect some homogeneous rays to a point, it could not do this for a heterogeneous 
mixture of rays.17  This realisation led Newton to build a reflecting telescope.  For, since “the 
Angle of Reflection of all sorts of Rays was equal to their Angle of Incidence” (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 95), 
Optick instruments might be brought to any degree of perfection imaginable, provided a Reflecting 
substance could be found, which would polish as finely as Glass, and reflect as much light, as glass 
transmits, and the art of communicating to it a Parabolick figure be also attained (Newton, 1959-1977: 
Vol. 1, 95). 
Newton’s discovery also had implications for a new theory of colour.  And it is to this 
colour theory that I now turn. 
2.2 A New Colour Theory 
In the final pages of his first paper, Newton announced a new theory of colour.  Until this 
point, the received theory of colour was a modificationist view.  By this view,18 white light is 
pure and homogeneous, and colours are produced when white light is modified in some 
way—for instance, when it is mixed with shadow or manipulated through reflection and 
refraction.  So far, Newton had demonstrated two things: firstly, that white light is not 
homogeneous, but rather is composed of rays of different refrangibilities; and secondly, that 
refrangibility is an original and immutable property of light.  Newton now argued that colour is 
similarly original and immutable and that white light is composed of rays of every spectral 
                                                 
17 And indeed this was the case, until Chester Moore Hall succeeded in developing the achromatic lens, 
shortly after Newton’s death. 
18 It is a little misleading to refer to the modificationist view, since many different ones were proposed by, 
e.g. Aristotle, Descartes and Hooke.  However, these all had one main feature in common: colour is the result 
of the modification of white light.  For a discussion of the various versions of this view, see (Zemplén, 2004). 
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colour.19  And so, according to Newton, white light is a mixture of spectral colours, and the 
prism simply causes them to separate—grouping them according to their colours.   
To understand Newton’s inference, it is worth digressing for a moment to consider how 
Newton’s experimentum crucis was received by his contemporaries. 
To begin, what is an ‘experimentum crucis’?  An experimentum crucis (lit. ‘experiment at a 
crossroads’) is an experiment designed to choose between two competing explanations.  
Newton’s concept of an experimentum crucis is usually taken to be related to Bacon’s instantia 
crucis (i.e. ‘crucial instance’).20  For Bacon, crucial instances were a subset of ‘instances with 
special powers’ (ISPs).  ISPs were experiments, procedures and instruments that were held 
to be particularly informative or illuminative of aspects of some inquiry into nature.  These 
served a variety of purposes.  Some functioned as ‘core experiments’, introduced at the very 
beginning of an investigation, and serving as the basis for further experiments.  Others 
played a role later in the process.  This included experiments that were supposed to be 
especially representative of a certain class of experiments, tools and experimental procedures 
that provided interesting investigative shortcuts, and model examples that came close to 
providing theoretical generalisations. 
Crucial instances were part of a subset of ISPs that were supposed to aid the intellect by 
“warning against false forms or causes” (Bacon, 2004: 445).  When two possible explanations 
seemed equally good, then the crucial instance was employed to decide between them.  To 
this end, it performed two functions: the negative function was to eliminate all possible 
explanations except the correct one; the positive function was to affirm the correct 
                                                 
19 Here’s a fun fact: Newton was the first to use the term ‘spectrum’ to describe the coloured band into 
which a beam of light is decomposed by means of a prism (OED, December 2015). 
20 Bacon used the term ‘instantia crucis’ (i.e. a ‘crucial instance’) in the Novum Organum, but there is some 
confusion in the literature as to who first introduced the related term ‘experimentum crucis’.  Peter Anstey and 
Michael Hunter have argued that, while the notion is often attributed to Hooke, it in fact should be attributed 
to Boyle, who introduced the notion in his Defence against Linus (1662) (Anstey & Hunter, 2008: 112). 
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explanation.21  Newton’s experimentum crucis performed a similar role,22 and in doing so, 
revealed a new property of white light. 
In his first paper, Newton made two claims in relation to the experimentum crucis: 
1) White light is composed of rays of many refrangibilities; and 
2) White light is composed of rays of many spectral colours. 
There is a standard account of this experiment, according to which the result was (2).  On 
this account, the experimentum crucis was designed to decide between two views on colour: the 
modificationist view and Newton’s view, that spectral colours are not generated by 
modification when the white light passes through the prism, but are already present in the light.  
This was how Hooke interpreted the experiment, and he thought it failed to decide 
conclusively in favour of Newton’s view.  In other words, Hooke denied that the experiment 
was a crucial experiment.23  He wrote: 
But how certaine soever I think myself of my hypothesis, wch I did not take up without first trying 
some hundreds of expts; yet I should be very glad to meet wth one Experimentum crucis from Mr 
Newton, that should divorce me from it.  But it is not that, which he soe calls, will doe the turne; for the 
same phænomenon will be salved by my hypothesis as well as by his without any manner of difficulty or 
straining […] (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 110-111) 
Let’s try to see the experiment as Hooke saw it.  Hooke saw white light enter the first 
prism and a spectrum of colours come out the other side.  Then, after isolating a single 
colour, he saw, say, red light enter the second prism and red light come out (see figure 4 
below for a simplified analysis).  While he agreed that (2) was a possible explanation of the 
                                                 
21 For a discussion of the role of the instantia crucis in Bacon, Boyle and Hooke, see (Dumitru, 2013).  For a 
discussion of the role of the experimentum crucis in Newton’s Principia, see (Walsh, 2015). 
22 It is worth noting, however, that Bacon’s notion of instantia crucis appears to be broader than Newton’s 
notion of experimentum crucis: where the former refers to observations and experiments, the latter refers almost 
exclusively to experiments.  In this sense, Newton’s experimentum crucis is similar to Boyle’s (Anstey & Hunter, 
2008: 112).  For a discussion of the relationship between Newton’s experimentum crucis and Bacon’s instantia 
crucis, see (Hamou, Forthcoming). 
23 In fact, Hooke was one of the few scientists who was able to replicate Newton’s experiment. 
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phenomenon, he didn’t think it was the only explanation.  As far as Hooke was concerned, 
the experiment showed that, once the light becomes red, it doesn’t change through 
refraction.  He saw no reason to conclude that the red must have already been in the white.  
An alternative explanation—one that, to his mind, Newton’s experiment hadn’t ruled out—
was that the prism irrevocably modified the light. 
 
Full experiment 
  
Prism 2: Red to red Prism 1: White to red 
Figure 4 Analysis of the experimentum crucis in colour 
As we saw in the previous section, however, Newton did not present the experimentum 
crucis in this way.  For one thing, as Phillipe Hamou has recently pointed out, Newton didn’t 
mention the rival, modificationist, view at all in his first paper (Hamou, Forthcoming).  In 
fact, the experiment was demonstrating a new effect—one for which there was no received 
explanation.  And for another thing, Newton took the result to be (1), above; this was an 
experiment on white light and its refrangibility; not colour.  This is crucial: Newton was 
concerned with geometrical factors such as the length of the image, the position of the 
image on the wall, the distance from the aperture to the prism and the prism to the wall, and 
the angles of incidence and refraction.  Newton’s initial surprise was the elongation of the 
image.  This was what he set out to explain.  Recall also that the other experiments he 
conducted in order to test various ‘suspicions’ also focused on geometrical factors, as 
opposed to the colour of the light.  In fact, as Hamou and Jalobeanu have noted, the 
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experimentum crucis merely makes explicit what was revealed by the preceding experiments 
(Hamou, Forthcoming, Jalobeanu, 2014).  Namely, that the elongation effect is not an 
artefact of the experimental set-up, but due to a property of light. 
Let’s consider the experiment as Newton saw it.  He conceived of the experiment as a 
series of lines and angles.  The light ray entered the prism at a certain angle and exited the 
prism at another angle: if light bent x degrees at the first prism, it also bent x degrees at the 
second prism (see figure 5 below for a simplified analysis).  That is, each time a particular ray 
passed through a prism it refracted to precisely the same degree.  For Newton, this 
demonstrated that refrangibility is an original and unchangeable property of light, not an 
effect of the prism.  And so, in reply to Hooke, Newton explained that the experimentum crucis 
demonstrated that rays of different colours are differently refrangible, and that this is not 
something that is caused by the prism (i.e. by “rarefying & splitting of rays” (Newton, 1959-
1977: Vol. 1, 187)).  Rather, this is a disposition that every ray already has—originally and 
immutably.  The prism had merely separated what was already distinct.  Having established 
(1) by experiment, Newton then inferred (2).  And so, Newton’s inference can be 
summarised as follows: 
P1. White light is composed of rays of many refrangibilities (1). 
P2. There is a one-to-one correspondence between refrangibility and original colour.24 
C. White light is composed of rays of many spectral colours (2). 
                                                 
24 In his Opticks, published in 1704, Newton offers experimental support for this proposition. 
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Full experiment 
  
Prism 2:  to  Prism 1:  to  
Figure 5 Analysis of the experimentum crucis in black and white 
Newton’s interpretation of the experimentum crucis illuminates two features of his 
methodology.  Firstly, it emphasises the importance of precise measurement in his quest for 
certainty.  It would have been difficult to measure precisely changes in colour, but Newton 
was able to measure the degrees of refraction by measuring the positions of the images on 
the wall.  He recorded observations that are measurable, quantitative and precise, since this 
data could be employed to reason mathematically to certain conclusions.  Newton wanted to 
establish physical properties with certainty, so it is no surprise that he eschewed talk of 
colour to focus on geometric properties.  Secondly, it demonstrates the deductive step in the 
argument.  Newton’s claim that white light is composed of rays of all the spectral colours, 
and his further claims about the properties of light, are inferred from his first claim.  Hooke 
saw the inference from observation to (2) as a single, experimental step.  Newton saw the 
inference from observation to (2) as two steps, one experimental (i.e. from the experimentum 
crucis to P1), one deductive (i.e. P1 and P2 together entailed C).  Newton had managed to 
integrate the study of colour with geometrical optics—an impressive achievement! 
Now let’s return to Newton’s new colour theory. 
After his initial insight on the relationship between refrangibility and colour, Newton 
developed a theory of colours, which he outlined in thirteen propositions (summarised in 
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table 1 below).  It’s worth noting a few key features of this theory.  Firstly, Newton 
distinguished between original colour, namely, colour as an inherent and immutable property 
of light, and compound colour, colour that is produced by combining light of different 
colours.  Newton argued that each ray has an original colour, and this is an unchangeable 
property of the ray.25  However, when combined with light of a different colour, it could 
appear to change colour.  Importantly, when mixed, each ray would retain its original 
properties. 
Newton thought that all the original colours could be replicated by combining colours—
their differences would only become apparent when they were separated again.  And so, you 
could have two samples of, say, yellow light that look the same but, when refracted, reveal 
different properties: homogeneous yellow light remains yellow-coloured even when 
refracted; whereas compound yellow light breaks into its component colours, say, red and 
green. 
The ability to separate light into its component colours highlights another feature of 
Newton’s theory: there is a one-to-one correspondence between spectral colour and 
refrangibility.  And so, light of the same colour has the same disposition to refract.  This is 
why, when white light passes through a prism, a spectrum is produced: the rays gather 
together into their homogeneous groups.  The causal relationship between refraction and 
colour was frequently misunderstood by Newton’s critics.  They often took Newton to be 
claiming that refrangibility somehow caused the production of colour.26  In fact, Newton 
                                                 
25 It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, Newton does not consider rays of light to be coloured.  In the 
Opticks, he included a definition: 
The homogeneal Light and Rays which appear red, or rather make Objects appear so, I call Rubrific or Red- making; those which 
make Objects appear yellow, green, blue and violet, I call Yellow-making, Green-making, Blue-making, Violet-making, and so of the 
rest.  And if at any time I speak of Light and Rays as coloured or endued with Colours, I would be understood to speak not 
philosophically and properly, but grossly, and accordingly to such Conceptions as vulgar People in seeing all these Experiments 
would be apt to frame.  For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured.  In them there is nothing else than a certain power and 
disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Colour.  For as Sound in a Bell or musical String or other sounding Body, is nothing 
but a trembling Motion, and in the Air nothing but that Motion propagated from the Object, and in the Sensorium ’tis a Sense of 
that Motion under the form of Sound; so Colours in the Object are nothing but a Disposition to reflect this or that sort of Rays 
more copiously than the rest; in the Rays they are nothing but their Dispositions to propagate this or that Motion into the 
Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are Sensations of those Motions under the forms of Colours (Newton, 1952: 124-125). 
26 This shows how deeply entrenched modificationist intuitions were! 
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thought that refrangibility causes the production of colour only insofar as it causes rays to 
separate into their different colours, thus, making the original colours visible.  Newton did 
not know why this one-to-one correspondence occurs, only that it does (Newton, 1959-1977: 
Vol. 1, 265).  As far as Newton was concerned, the only difference between white light and 
any other compound colour was that there was no original white: white could only be 
produced by combination.  This contradicted the received view that white light was 
homogeneous and that colours were created by modification of white light. 
Prop 1 Colours are not caused by refraction or reflection but are original properties of rays of 
light. 
Prop 2 There is a one-to-one correspondence between colour and refrangibility. 
Prop 3 The colour and refrangibility of any given ray are constant and unchangeable. 
Prop 4 The colour of light can be changed by composition and decomposition.  But such 
changes are not real, only apparent – each individual ray always retains its original 
colour. 
Prop 5 There are two kinds of colours: original and compound. 
Prop 6 New (compound) colours, which look the same as original colours, are created by 
combining original colours. 
Prop 7 Whiteness is not an original colour, but a compound of all the original colours. 
Prop 8 White light is a mixture of all original colours in equal amounts.  If there is more or 
less of some particular colour, then the light will not be white. 
Prop 9 A prism produces coloured light by separating white light into its constituent rays by 
refraction. 
Prop 10 Rainbows appear because water droplets refract sunlight. 
Prop 11 Some bodies appear one colour in one position and another colour in another position 
because they are illuminated by, and so transmit, different coloured light. 
Prop 12 If two glass vessels are filled one with red liquid and the other with blue liquid, 
separately they are transparent, but together they become opaque.  This is because 
one only transmits red rays and the other only blue rays, so together they do not 
transmit any rays. 
Prop 13 All coloured bodies obtain their colour via refraction, reflection and transmission of 
the rays of light that illuminate them. 
Table 1 Summary of Newton’s new theory of light (as presented in February 1672) 
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Now that we have the general shape of Newton’s theory of colour, let’s look more 
closely at his claims about original or primary colours. 
3 On the number and division of colours 
In this section, I explain Newton’s position on the number and division of colours.  I argue 
that, for Newton, (1) there are many colours (not simply the seven of ROYGBIV) and (2) 
they are ‘indefinite’ in an epistemic sense—that is, there are many of them (in fact, one for 
each angle of refraction!), and we don’t currently know how many. 
Newton stated his position in his expansion of proposition 5 (paraphrased in table 1 
above): 
5. There are therefore two sorts of colours.  The one original and simple, the other compounded of 
these.  The original or primary colours are, Red, Yellow, Green, Blew, and a Violet-purple, together with 
Orange, Indico, and an indefinite variety of Intermediate gradations (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 98). 
As we’ve already noted, proposition 5 draws a distinction between original and compound 
colours.  Original colours are the inherent, immutable properties of individual rays of light.  
When lights of two different colours are combined, they will produce some other colour—a 
compound.  But each ray retains its original colour, which can be seen when the compound 
is separated (say, using a prism) into its component colours. 
So, according to Newton, there are two kinds of colours: original (or primary) and 
compound.  But how many original colours are there?  The above passage might seem 
confusing.  Newton first names the five colours of the rainbow, then he adds two more 
colours, giving us seven main colours (which eventually became known as ROYGBIV).27  
But then he adds that there are “an indefinite variety of Intermediate gradations”.  So, 
according to Newton, there are seven main colours and also a number of intermediate 
colours.  This passage raises two questions.  (1) what does Newton mean by ‘indefinite’?  
                                                 
27 It is not clear in what sense Newton’s seven-colour spectrum was new, since the notion of a seven-
colour spectrum dates back at least to Aristotle.  Establishing the originality of Newton’s spectrum is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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And (2) is there anything special about the seven main colours?  I’ll address each of these 
questions in turn. 
3.1 What does Newton mean by ‘indefinite’? 
We should interpret ‘indefinite’ epistemically, not metaphysically.  That is, Newton was saying 
that the number of original colours is uncounted and therefore unknown, as opposed to 
uncountable.  Here’s why. 
Firstly, to anyone who read his ‘New Theory’, it was clear that Newton thought that 
light was corpuscular.  That is, light is composed of miniscule bodies or atoms.  He wrote: 
For, since Colours are the qualities of Light, having its Rays for their intire and immediate subject, how 
can we think those Rays qualities also, unless one quality may be the subject of and sustain another; 
which in effect is to call it substance.  We should not know Bodies for substances, were it not for their 
sensible qualities, and the Principal of those being now found due to something else, we have as good 
reason to believe that to be a Substance also (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 100). 
Here, Newton was arguing that, since colour is a sensible quality of light, light must be a 
substance.  That is, colour must be a property of particles, or corpuscles, of light.28  While he 
tried to keep them separate,29 Newton’s corpuscularian suppositions seem to have influenced 
his theoretical claims.  For example, he argued that original colours remain distinct and 
unaltered when they are mixed to form white light.30  He was thinking of rays as analogous 
                                                 
28 But Newton was cautious.  He said that although he had established that light is heterogeneous, “to 
determine more absolutely, what Light is, after what manner refracted, and by what modes or actions it 
produceth in our minds the Phantasms of Colours, is not so easie” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 100).  He said 
that he was not willing to speculate any further on these matters. 
29 I discuss Newton’s separation of hypotheses and theories below. 
30 Sabra has pointed out that this was barely intelligible to wave theorists (Sabra, 1967: 280-282). 
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to, say, grains of sand or powder: the particles mix together, but each retains its separate 
identity.31  In short, Newton conceived of light as composed of discrete particles. 
Secondly, as we’ve seen, Newton, indexed original colour to refrangibility: that is, there 
is an original colour for each degree of refraction.  This is indicated in proposition 2 in 
Newton’s ‘New Theory’ paper (see table 1 above), but stated explicitly in a letter to Huygens 
in 1673: 
3. There are as many simple or homogeneal colours as degrees of refrangibility.  For to every degree of 
refrangibility belongs a different colour by Prop: 2.  And that colour is simple by Def: 1. & 3. (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 293).32 
Thirdly, Newton thought that refrangibility is an original and immutable property of 
light.  Since light is corpuscular, refrangibility is a property of each discrete particle of light.  
And so the number of degrees of refrangibility must be countable in principle—and by 
extension, the number of colours must be in principle definable. 
And so, by ‘indefinite’ Newton must have meant ‘uncounted’ rather than ‘uncountable’.  
The notion of colour as metaphysically indefinite is incompatible with Newton’s thinking of 
light in corpuscularian—and therefore discrete (and countable)—terms.  For colour to be 
metaphysically indefinite, Newton needed to argue that refrangibility is indeterminate and 
uncountable—but then he could not have held refrangibility to be an original property of 
light (and therefore indexed to colour). 
3.2 Is there anything special about the seven main colours? 
As I’ve mentioned, Newton is credited with the ‘discovery’ of ROYGBIV, which involved 
adding two extra colours to the spectrum, bringing the total to seven.  This might seem 
strange, given that Newton argued that there were an indefinite number of original colours.  
                                                 
31 Newton recognised this metaphysical commitment when he said: “Besides, who ever thought any 
quality to be a heterogeneous aggregate, such as Light is discovered to be” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 100).  
In other words, substances can be combined in this way, but qualities cannot. 
32 In this letter to Huygens, Newton presented a new version of his theory of colours in a series of 
definitions and propositions. 
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It wasn’t until 1675, when Newton published a follow-up paper, his ‘Hypothesis concerning 
light and colours’ (hereafter, ‘Hypothesis’), that the reason became clear:33 Newton wanted to 
improve the analogy between spectral colour and harmonics.  This has often been 
interpreted as Pythagorean—the thought being that there is something mystical or 
metaphysically special about the mathematical relationships which manifest in shapes, 
sounds, numbers and visual angles.  And so Newton has often been interpreted as arguing 
that the seven main colours are ontologically privileged.  In this section, however, I argue 
that Newton doesn’t think there is anything metaphysically special about the seven main 
colours. 
Let’s start by examining the context in which Newton introduced his analogy between 
spectral colour and harmonics: his ‘Hypothesis’.  The account Newton laid down in this 
paper is composed of the following six hypotheses: 
1. There is an ‘æthereal medium’, which is similar to air, but rarer, more penetrating and 
more strongly elastic (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 364). 
2. Æther vibrates, carrying sounds, smells and light.  While the vibrations differ in size, 
they are on the whole (much) smaller and swifter than the vibrations of air (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 366). 
3. Æther penetrates and passes through the pores of solid substances such as crystal, glass 
and water.  But æther is less dense within those pores than without (Newton, 1959-
1977: Vol. 1, 366-367). 
4. Light is neither the æther itself, nor the vibrations, but a substance that is propagated 
from ‘lucid’ bodies and travels through the æther (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 370). 
5. Light warms the æther and the æther presses on the light.  Thus, the mutual action of 
light on æther, and æther on light, explains how light is reflected and refracted (Newton, 
1959-1977: Vol. 1, 371). 
6. The rays (or bodies) of which light consists differ from one another physically.  These 
physical differences are unchangeable and cause the rays to be different colours.  This 
                                                 
33 Newton sent his ‘Hypothesis’ to the Royal Society in December 1675, but manuscript evidence shows 
that the bulk of this paper was completed in 1672. 
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explains how it happens that colour and refrangibility are unchangeable properties of 
light (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 376). 
Newton’s aim in this paper was of an entirely different kind to that of his ‘New Theory’.  
There, Newton was describing observed phenomena of light and inferring its properties.  He 
‘proved’ these propositions about light by experiment—the experimentum crucis.  Here Newton 
was in the business of hypothesising about the nature of light: the unobserved mechanism 
which caused the observed phenomena.  He didn’t attempt to ‘prove’ these theories, but just 
to make them plausible.  He emphasised that he only intended his account to be a possible 
explanation.  And so, the kind of support Newton offered for these hypotheses was also 
different to that from his ‘New Theory’.  Here, he drew on various experiments and 
observations, which he took to underwrite the plausibility of hypotheses 1-6, either by 
analogy, direct empirical support, or by demonstrating explanatory power.  This is a stark 
contrast to the certainty he claimed from the experimentum crucis. 
In his discussion of hypothesis 6, Newton introduced his analogy between spectral 
colour and harmonics.  He argued that the “principall Degrees” of colour—red, orange, 
yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet—may be proportional just as musical tones are 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 376).  This wasn’t pure speculation.  To establish the intervals 
between the seven ‘principall’ colours on the spectrum, he projected a spectrum onto a piece 
of white paper using a prism.  He held the paper while an assistant marked the parts of the 
image where each colour was “most full & brisk, & also where he judged the truest confines 
of them to be” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 376).34  He then superimposed a monochord35 
                                                 
34 Newton explained that he employed an assistant to make the judgements “partly because my owne eyes 
are not very criticall in distinguishing colours, partly because another, to whome I had not communicated my 
thoughts about this matter, could have nothing by his eyes to determin his fancy in makeing those marks” 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 376). 
35 A monochord is a musical stringed instrument wherein a single string is stretched over a sound box.  
The string is fixed at both ends, and one or more movable bridges are manipulated to demonstrate 
mathematical relationships between sounds.  It was used as a scientific instrument to illustrate the mathematical 
properties of musical pitch. 
 22 
on the spectrum and claimed that the seven colours correspond to the division of the 
monochord into seven notes (see figure 6 below).  Newton wrote:  
And possibly colour may be distinguisht into its principall Degrees, Red, Orange, Yellow, Green, Blew, 
Indigo, and deep Violett, on the same ground, that sound with an eighth is graduated into tones 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 376). 
Newton made a similar argument in his Opticks (1704), describing the seven principal colours 
as “divided after the manner of a Musical Chord” (Newton, 1952: 126), and as “proportional 
to the seven Musical Tones or Intervals of the eight Sounds, Sol, la, fa, sol, la, mi, fa, sol” 
(Newton, 1952: 154).36 
This work has often been viewed as Pythagorean, in that Newton was apparently trying 
to explain other natural phenomena in terms of musical harmonies (e.g. Gouk, 1988, Pesic, 
2006).  If this were the case, then Newton should be interpreted as assigning some sort of 
ontological or metaphysical priority to the seven main colours.  Niccolò Guicciardini, 
however, has recently offered an alternative interpretation of this work (Guicciardini, 2013).  
Guicciardini argues that, if we consider the context in which this analogy is introduced, we 
should see that Newton isn’t being Pythagorean at all.  He doesn’t think there is anything 
mystical or metaphysically special about the relationship between colour and sound.  Rather, 
as we shall see, he is making an aesthetic point—and uses the analogy between optics and 
harmonics to develop a theory of perception. 
                                                 
36 He continued to hold, however, that there were many degrees of colour: “the Spectrum pt formed by 
the separated Rays [...] appear tinged with this Series of Colours, violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange, red, 
together with all their intermediate Degrees in a continual Succession perpetually varying.  So that there 
appeared as many Degrees of Colours, as there were sorts of Rays differing in Refrangibility" (Newton, 1952: 
122). 
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Figure 6 Newton’s demonstration of the analogy between harmonics of colour and sound37 
Newton introduced hypothesis 6 to explain colour vision.  On his account, corpuscles of 
light travel through the æther, causing the æther to vibrate—different colours produce 
vibrations of different sizes.  These æthereal vibrations travel along the ‘optick nerves’, 
causing us to perceive colour.38  The analogy between harmonics and colour is supposed to 
contribute to this account by unifying sound and vision into a theory of perception.  In his 
discussion of hypothesis 2, Newton drew a similar analogy between light and sound.  He 
argued that, just as “in a ring of Bells the sound of every tone is heard at two or three miles 
distance, in the Same Order that the bells are Stroke”, it is possible for æthereal vibrations to 
vary in size but not speed (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 366).  This suggests that Newton was 
interested in explaining colour vision in terms of æthereal vibrations and developing a 
                                                 
37 Analogy between the prismatic spectrum and the musical scale (a Dorian mode equivalent to playing the 
white notes on a piano keyboard from D to d) (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol 1, 376). 
38 For a discussion of Newton’s theory of vision, see (Hamou, 2014). 
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unified account of perception—he doesn’t seem to think there is any mystical 
correspondence between colour and harmonics. 
For Guicciardini, then, Newton’s analogy between harmonics and colour is motivated 
by his interest in the physiology of perception.  I now want to build on this account, and 
argue that for Newton, the seven-colour spectrum is merely an aesthetic, or perceptual 
phenomenon.  That is, there is nothing metaphysically special or privileged about 
ROYGBIV but, as a matter of contingent fact about our visual apparatus, we tend to 
emphasise those aspects of the spectrum.  Such a suggestion nicely explains how Newton 
could, on the one hand, claim that there are many original colours, and on the other hand, 
emphasise these seven colours for apparently non-arbitrary reasons.  This is a bit of 
speculation on my part, but it is not wholly unfounded.  Firstly, the consistency of the 
reading lends it some plausibility.  Secondly, it is not entirely without textural support.  
Consider the following passage from Newton’s manuscript ‘Of Musick’:39 
5. An 8th is next divided into a third major & 6th minor, & lastly into a 3rd minor & 6th major these are all 
the concords contained in an Eighth.  Hereto annex a discourse of the 3rds & 6ths. 
The notes in order of concordance 
eighth. 5th. 3rd maj. 4th. 6th maj. 3rd min. 6th min. 2nd maj. 7th maj. 7th min. 2nd min. 5th min. 
But as too sudden a change from less to greater light offends the eye by reason of that, the spirits 
rarefied by the augmented motion of the light too violently stretch the optic nerve: so the sudden 
passing from grave to acute sounds is not so pleasant as if it were done by degrees, because of too great 
a change of motion made thereby in the auditory spirits.  And as a man suddenly coming from greater 
to less light, cannot discern objects thereby so well, as if he came to it by degrees or as when he hath 
stayed some while in the lesser light (by reason that the motion of the spirits in the optic nerve caused 
by the greater light, doth, until it be allayed; disturb so as it were drown the motion of the weaker light) 
so if the slower motion of the lower sound immediately succeed the much more small motion of the 
higher its impression on the auditory spirits—being then less perceptible, the lower sound must be less 
pleasant than if the step had been graduated.  Thus a little heat is least perceptible to one newly come 
from a greater.  Corollary: 1. The distance of sounds adds to the imperfection of their concordance.  
                                                 
39 This manuscript is found in a notebook kept by Newton during 1664-1666 (Cambridge University 
Library Add. Ms. 4000, ff. 137–143).  I quote this passage from (Pesic, 2006: 299-300).  In an attempt at clarity, 
I have flouted convention by regularising Newton’s spelling and omitting his editing marks. 
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Corollary. 2: Tis better to descend than ascend by leaps the first making the highest sound harsher; the 
second making the lower only less perceptible […] 
Here, Newton is not concerned with colour but brightness of light, however notice three 
things about this passage.  Firstly, Newton relies on experiential judgements, such as 
‘pleasantness’ and ‘harshness’, to develop his analogy between sound and light.  This 
supports my suggestion that Newton’s focus is aesthetic, rather than metaphysical.  
Secondly, he offers physiological explanations for the analogy.  And thirdly, he begins by 
drawing an analogy between sound and light, but then extends the analogy to heat.  The 
latter two points support the above suggestion that Newton is interested less in the 
metaphysical significance of mathematical proportions, and more interested in the 
physiology of perception.40 
Having established that Newton indeed thought there were many colours, let’s now 
consider how his critics took the news. 
4 The debate 
As we’ve seen, Newton’s ‘New Theory’ sparked some lively debate.  This was no doubt due, 
in large part, to the brevity of the paper—and the fact that Newton’s claims to certainty 
seemed epistemically reckless.  However, several of Newton’s critics also perceived serious 
conceptual difficulties with his new theory of light and colours.  One issue, raised by both 
Huygens and Hooke, concerned the number and division of primary colours.  Newton 
argued that there is an indefinite number of ‘primary’ colours, but Hooke and Huygens 
objected to this inflated ontology.  Each critic argued, for different reasons, that there were 
only two primary colours.  In this section, I’ll examine Huygens’ and Hooke’s criticisms.  I’ll 
argue that these criticisms stemmed, not simply from a misunderstanding of Newton’s 
(admittedly brief) characterisation of his view, but also from the fact that they and Newton 
had very different research programmes. 
                                                 
40 Moreover, my speculation has other potential routes to testing (which I won’t explore here).  For 
instance, if Newton thinks that ROYGBIV is a set of aesthetic categories, he will likely think the same of 
musical scales—and potentially take a similar angle on other distinctions of this kind.  If more of Newton’s 
manuscripts are examined in this light, and a pattern emerges, this would lend further support. 
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4.1 Newton versus Hooke 
As we’ve seen, Newton argued that the number of different original colours was indefinite.  
However, Hooke did not think it necessary to postulate more than two colours.  He wrote: 
But as to the fifth [proposition], yt there are an indefinite variety of primary or originall colours, 
amongst which are yellow, green, violet, purple, orange &c and an indefinite number of intermediat 
gradations; I cannot assent thereunto, as supposing it wholy useless to multiply entites wthout necessity: 
since I have elswhere shewn, that all the varietys of colours in the world may be made by the help of 
two (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 113). 
According to Hooke, many apparent differences in the colour of light were really differences 
in the amount of light.  And so, to claim that there are more than two primary colours is to 
multiply entities beyond necessity.  In response, Newton argued that Hooke was begging the 
question—instead of presupposing uniformity, we should take the appearances of things as 
phenomena to be explained. 
Newton considered Hooke’s experiment involving two vessels filled with coloured 
liquid.41  In one, the liquid was coloured by ‘tincture of Aloes’.  The liquid was mostly red, but 
around the edges it was yellow.  In the other vessel, the liquid was coloured with a copper 
solution.  The liquid was mostly blue, but around the edges it was indigo.  Newton argued: 
Now if Mr Hook contend that all the Reds & Yellows of the one liquor, or Blews & Indicos of the other, are 
onely various degrees & dilutings of the same colour, & not divers colours, that is a begging of ye 
Question […]  Certainly it is much better to believe our senses informing us that Red & Yellow are 
divers colours, & to make it a Philosophicall Query, why the same Liquor doth according to its various 
thicknesse appear of those divers colours, then to suppose them to be the same colour because 
exhibited by the same liquor (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 179). 
In contrast with his own approach, Newton noted that Hooke appeared to be 
concerned with theoretical virtues such as subtlety and intelligibility, rather than epistemic 
virtues (i.e. those that are directly related to empirical support and truth).  He thought that 
Hooke was “valuing uncertain speculations for their subtleties, or despising certainties for 
                                                 
41 Here, Newton was referring to experiments described in Hooke’s Micrographia (Hooke, 1966/1665: 48), 
which Hooke mentioned in his response to Newton’s paper. 
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their plainesse”, when he ought to have been making “a sincere endeavour after knowledge” 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 171).  Newton thought that Hooke should be concerned with 
whether or not the evidence supports the new theory; not whether or not his hypothesis fits the theory.42 
4.2 Newton versus Huygens 
Huygens did not dispute Newton’s experimental results.  Furthermore, he allowed that 
Newton was probably correct about some of the properties of light and colours he 
described.43  However, he raised two main objections to Newton’s paper. 
Huygens’ first objection concerned Newton’s proposition that white light is composed 
of an indefinite number of colours.  Huygens argued that two primary colours, yellow and 
blue, are sufficient to produce all the other colours (including white).  He gave two reasons 
for limiting the number of primary colours to two.  (1) A methodological reason: it is easier 
to give a mechanical explanation when there are fewer colours to explain.  Such an 
explanation is simpler, and therefore better.  (2) An empirical reason: it is possible to 
produce white light (and all the other colours) by mixing just two primary colours, blue and 
yellow, in various proportions.  Thus, he claimed he could show by experiment that 
Newton’s condition (many colours in equal proportions) was only sufficient for white light, 
but not necessary.44 
                                                 
42 Newton was clearly disappointed that Hooke had failed to recognise the epistemically special 
relationship between his new theory and his experiments (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 171).  For, instead of 
considering Newton’s support for his theory, Hooke had discussed whether another hypothesis could fit the 
evidence just as well.  However, it is useful to note that Newton misinterpreted Hooke’s objection.  Where 
Newton took Hooke to be attempting to assert his own hypothesis in place of Newton’s, Hooke was in fact 
careful to point out that other hypotheses could also fit the facts (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 113). 
43 It is worth noting that, while both Hooke and Huygens had stakes in the debate in that they both had 
recently published books concerning optics, they weren’t threatened to the same extent by Newton’s new 
theory.  Huygens had developed a mathematical wave theory, which developed the notion of wave fronts, but 
which didn’t deal with colour.  In contrast, Hooke’s wave theory offered a new modificationist account of 
colour.  Hooke had more to lose. 
44 Although Huygens did admit that he hadn’t tried this yet (“car cette pensee ne m’est venue qu’a cette heure” 
(Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 257, n.4)). 
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Newton dismissed the methodological argument.  His pointed out firstly that fewer 
colours does not necessarily mean fewer, or simpler, explanations, and secondly that 
Huygens’ two-colour model is not as simple as he thinks.  While Newton’s theory only needs 
to give one explanation of colour, Huygens’ theory needs to give two (one to explain how light 
is coloured, and one to explain why there are only two primary colours).  Newton concluded 
that, if ease of formulating an explanation were indeed a relevant concern, then surely it 
would speak in favour of his theory rather than Huygens’. 
Newton’s response to Huygens’ empirical argument was two-pronged.  On the first 
prong, he challenged the accuracy of Huygens’ experiment.  He suspected that Huygens had 
combined compounds, instead of original colours, to produce white (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 
265).  Newton recommended therefore that, before combining the colours to make white, 
Huygens should try properly to separate the light into uncompounded colours.  Only then, 
when he was certain he had original yellow and original blue and no other colours, should he try 
to make white out of them.  On the second prong, while remaining sceptical that Huygens 
had managed to produce white from two original colours, Newton argued that, in any case, 
such an event would not refute his theory.  For, if a white was produced out of original blue 
and original yellow, it wouldn’t have the same properties as sunlight.  This is because original 
blue and original yellow cannot separate into any other colours.  Moreover, light is still 
composed of heterogeneous beams of varying colour and refrangibility, even if there is more 
than one way of creating visually similar compounds.45 
Huygens’ second objection concerned Newton’s method of hypothesis-avoidance.  He 
argued that Newton’s theory was incomplete without a hypothesis.  For, without a 
mechanical explanation of the nature of light and colours, Newton had not taught us about 
the nature and difference of colours, but only the accident (“mais seulemt cet accident”) of their 
different refrangibility (“de leur differente refrangibilité” (Newton, 1959-1977: Vol. 1, 256)). 
                                                 
45 Nevertheless, from then on, Newton was always careful to distinguish between sunlight and white light!  
See (e.g. Newton, 1952: 26, 63, 116). 
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Newton replied to this objection by clarifying the aims of his inquiry, and how these 
related to his distinction between theories and hypotheses (outlined in table 2 below).46  This is a 
good opportunity to remind ourselves of how Newton thought of this distinction. 
In Newton’s methodology, theories and hypotheses deal with different subject matter, 
have different epistemic status and perform different roles in theorising.  Theories 
systematise the observable, measurable properties of things; hypotheses describe the 
(unobservable) nature of things.  Theories are inferred from observation and experiment; 
hypotheses are speculative.  And so, Newton’s claims about the composition of white light, 
and the thirteen propositions of his theory of colours, were theories; but his claims about the 
corpuscular nature of light were hypotheses. 
Theory Hypothesis 
A proposition is a ‘theory’ iff it meets the following 
conditions: 
T1. It is certainly true, because it is reliably 
inferred from experiment; 
T2. It is experimental—something that has 
empirically testable consequences; and 
T3. It is concerned with the observable, 
measurable properties of the thing, rather 
than its nature. 
A proposition is a ‘hypothesis’ iff it meets one 
or more of the following conditions: 
H1. It is, at best, only highly probable; or 
H2. It is a conjecture or speculation—
something not based on empirical 
evidence; or 
H3. It is concerned with the nature of the 
thing, rather than its observable, 
measurable properties. 
Table 2 Definitions of ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ 
The distinction between theories and hypotheses is central to Newton’s methodology.  
For Newton, theories were on epistemically surer footing than hypotheses because they were 
grounded on phenomena, whereas the latter were grounded in speculations.  And so 
hypotheses could never trump theories.  When faced with a disagreement between a 
hypothesis and a theory (for instance, suppose our theory seems to imply action-at-a-
distance, but the most plausible hypothesis about the nature of motion tells us that action-at-
a-distance is impossible), we should modify the hypothesis to fit our theory, and not vice 
                                                 
46 For a discussion of the distinction between theories and hypotheses in early modern philosophy more 
generally, see (Ducheyne, 2013). 
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versa.  The distinction was nicely captured in a draft letter from Newton to Roger Cotes 
(March 1713): 
And therefore as I regard not hypotheses in explaining the phenomena of nature, so I regard them not 
in opposition to arguments founded upon phenomena by induction or to principles settled upon such 
arguments.  In arguing for any principle or proposition from phenomena by induction, hypotheses are 
not to be considered.  The argument holds good till some phenomenon can be produced against it 
(Newton, 2004: 120). 
And so, while Newton railed against hypotheses (most (in)famously “Hypotheses non fingo”)—
determined to preserve the certainty of his propositions and to avoid epistemic loss by 
keeping speculative conjectures apart—hypotheses played an important role in Newton’s 
negotiations between certainty and speculation.47 
Huygens’ demand that Newton provide a hypothesis—speculate about the underlying 
nature of light—then, clashed directly with Newton’s methodological commitment to 
providing theories rather than hypotheses.  Having said this, Newton was perhaps sensitive 
to the need for a theory to be at least possible, and this may explain his decision to develop 
and publish the much more speculative corpuscular hypothesis in 1675. 
4.3 Newton’s Research Programme  
Newton’s responses to Hooke and Huygens reveal some of the important—perhaps 
revolutionary—features of his method and his research program.  Where Hooke 
presupposed a certain uniformity in light, and this coloured (if I may) his interpretation of 
experimental results, Newton strove to keep his speculations and his phenomena distinct.  
Where Huygens appealed to explanatory virtues and saw a crucial role for speculative 
hypotheses, Newton instead focused on what could be mathematically stated about the 
phenomena. 
These features, as well as Newton’s careful concern for experimental precision, reflect 
Newton’s overall aim of certainty.  By establishing a new property of sunlight (i.e. its 
heterogeneity) beyond reasonable doubt via experiment, as Newton claimed to have done 
                                                 
47 For an extended discussion of the respective roles of hypotheses and queries in Newton’s natural 
philosophy, see (Walsh, 2014). 
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with his experimentum crucis, and by inferring a theory of light from that property, Newton 
created a geometric, precise and systematised science of colour.  Such a programme treats 
metaphysical speculation about the nature of things as secondary—even when Newton did 
publish his ‘Hypothesis’, he intended it to be a possibility proof of his theory.  This disdain 
for speculation is, perhaps, reflected as well in his aesthetic/perceptual emphasis on 
ROYBGIV.  For Newton, the so-called ‘primary colours’ are not privileged due to the 
nature of light (after all if indeed he wanted to argue such a thing, he would have needed 
some way of proving it) but due to contingent features of human experience. 
Newton’s early optical work, then, was not only revolutionary for what it told us about 
light and colour.  It was also a fine example of the methodological innovations which Newton 
bought to the early modern table. 
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